Moneyball enters the lexicon of Liverpool
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The journey from Bill Shankly to Billy Beane took half a century. One of football's most famous socialists was the founding father of Liverpool Football Club in its preferred incarnation as England's dominant force. Now that a second set of American capitalists have purchased the club, Oakland Athletics, the overachieving baseball team, appear to have replaced Glenbuck Cherrypickers, Shankly's exotically-named first club, as a reference point at Anfield.
Bills, along with cheques, cash and other forms of payment, are at the heart of the issue. A path can be drawn from Moneyball, the vogue book tracing Beane's progress as general manager of Oakland, where a low budget yielded high returns, to the appointment of Damien Comolli as the snappily-titled director of football strategy at Anfield. But it is just as pertinent to interpret it as an expression of John W Henry's admiration of Arsene Wenger.
It is understandable. Henry is a businessman, Wenger the best business mind in football management. He has accomplished what successive regimes at Anfield could not and financed a lucrative new ground while producing competitive teams. Comolli's former employer - he was Arsenal's European scout - is both economist and pioneer.
From a financial perspective, his greatest find was one of his first, Nicolas Anelka, bought for £500,000 and sold for £23 million. Or, to put it another way, a return of 4,600% on the original investment. It prompted the current global search for emerging talent. Without Wenger, would Manchester United have brought Federico Macheda, the Da Silva twins and Bebe to Old Trafford at such a young age?
But, as Liverpool know better than most, identifying potential is a perilous process. Some of Anthony Le Tallec, Florent Sinama-Pongolle, Antonio Barragan, Sebastian Leto, Krisztian Nemeth and Mikel San Jose have produced a profit, but none made a major impact in the first team.
Hence Comolli's arrival and the importing of ideas from the Boston Red Sox who, in turn, sought to emulate Beane. Sabermetrics is basing decisions on statistical analysis - perhaps an irony at Anfield given Rafa Benitez's infamous fondness for "facts" - and an attempt to find undervalued players. It emphasises that perception isn't reality, as can be illustrated with a glance at some of English football's traditional big spenders who judged players by the size of their reputation, salary or transfer fee.
But there are problems with implementing the numbers game. Baseball lends itself more obviously to such a model than football, where besides the intangibles - team spirit, communication - the importance of a unit means players have to be assessed by their performance as part of a group. In a back four, a defender who wins all his headers and tackles might pass a factual test, but one who kept on playing opponents onside would be deemed a liability. Then there is the difference open play, an alien concept in baseball, makes as statistics require context and interpretation. Assuming that the players with the highest pass completion rates are the finest distributors might merely result in an accumulation of unadventurous defensive midfielders.
Here, once again, Wenger assumes a significance. In every outfield position, an example can be found of his ability to unearth a bargain. Comolli is credited with some, including Gael Clichy and Kolo Toure (despite recent revisionism, he merits rather less praise for signing Gareth Bale for Tottenham, whose ability was apparent to all the many Premier League managers who scouted him). Reflected glory has played a part in bringing him to Anfield.
Clichy is a prime case of Moneyball. Signed for £250,000, he is approaching 250 games for Arsenal and worth anything from £5 million to £15 million (while some discuss players' values in fixed terms, it is worth remembering that they fluctuate and, more to the point, a footballer is only worth what someone is prepared to pay for him). Liverpool's left back, in comparison, is Paul Konchesky, four years his senior, costing £4 million and arguably an inferior player.
Arsenal's, in short, is a far more cost-effective model. Where Liverpool spent £5 million on Christian Poulsen, Wenger has the more powerful, accomplished, Alex Song, seven years his junior, and priced at only £1 million when he arrived.
Song ranks among the Premier League's best performers in his position. His recruitment represents an excellent judgment call. So does that of Clichy who - while Bale operates in midfield and Aleksandar Kolarov finds his feet at Manchester City - could be called the third best left back in the division.
And that hints at the limits of 'Wengernomics'. Clichy offers outstanding value for money, but the two stand-out left backs are Ashley Cole and Patrice Evra, both costlier - though certainly still qualifying as excellent buys - and probably better paid. Arsenal invariably lose to Chelsea and normally to Manchester United, Cole and Evra's employers. Take Clichy as a microcosm of the team and it explains why Arsenal are consistently competitive without winning anything since 2005.
As £500,000 purchased Cesc Fabregas, one of the world's great central midfielders, that is a simplification but it taps into a common complaint among Arsenal fans: that Wenger's way has resulted in fine players arriving, but not enough of the calibre to capture silverware. It means that while Arsenal's model has obvious appeal to an owner, such as Henry, supporters of Liverpool, after two decades without a league title, may still have reservations.
A parallel with another who applied more scientific methods is that Oakland's results tailed off as others copied them. While Arsenal remain ever-presents in the top four, their rivals have expanded scouting teams in Europe, Africa and South America; the inspiration for United's last three titles was Cristiano Ronaldo, signed at 18 for just over £12 million.
While the surfeit of mediocrity among the squad players is a regular complaint at Anfield, Wenger's brand of alchemy would be welcome. But amid the many newer and more complex theories floating around sport, one basic truism often applies: the team with the best players wins.
And long before Moneyball entered the sporting vocabulary, Shankly appointed Geoff Twentyman chief scout at Anfield. He recommended an unknown Ian Rush, signed by Bob Paisley, for £300,000 and an untried Alan Hansen, who cost £110,000, possibly Liverpool's greatest goalscorer and centre back respectively. Whether the inspiration comes from across the Atlantic or deep into the club's past, from statistics or intuition, those are the sort of signings Comolli requires.
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mainly what they are trying to say is the scouting of players.. and the price values.
but are the new owner willing to spend? we shall see..